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BARBARA, THE MARKET,
AND THE STATE
Nancy Folbre

A B S T RA C T
Some re ections, in poetry and prose, on Barbara Bergmann’s contributions
to economic theory.
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A F A I R Y TA L E
People say that, once upon a time, there was an emperor,
Fond of silks and satins, vain to a fault, fearful that his naked parts
Did not measure up, who employed many a tailor to construct
A wondrous wardrobe that could make him look greater than he was.
Yet he also wanted to seem good and kind and true because
His authority rested on the consent of those he ruled.
The emperor’s objective function, economists would describe
As positive and decreasing in all Z goods related to his own
appearance
And consumption; picture an indifference curve describing
combinations
Of virtue and privilege that would equally suit; equilibrium depends
On the relative price of both, the noble budget line, and hence,
It matters that honesty is by far the most expensive good.
Of this, the emperor was well aware; by birth and training both
He was a rational economic man, indeed, a Harvard Ph.D.
So when a good deal came along, he laughed, he smiled, he hired
The tailor who offered two goods for the price of one, a suit of clothes
Flattering to the body and the soul – it could be seen only by those
Of perfect virtue; no sinful mortal could perceive, much less understand it.

The courtiers vied to offer praise and explanation, suggesting that
The tailor who designed this suit (it was said to have three pieces,
Narrow lapels, an Italian look) could not himself be seen,
Paeans to his invisible hands were sung, theorems and proofs devised,
Along with models, tests of signi cance, and some accumulated lies.
The emperor’s new clothes acquired the power of a sorceror’s spell –
Until one day the theoretically well-dressed went on parade.
It was, perhaps, quite chilly out; the emperor knew he should feel
warm,
But nonetheless began to shiver, poor man, he actually had nothing
on;
A TV anchorman praised his coat, but many viewers had just begun
to doubt,
The story goes, when a young boy grabbed a mike and began to
shout . . .
But this account, of course, was written by a guy.
In fact, it was Barbara who announced that the emperor wore no
clothes,
And at  rst everyone insisted this was too vulgar to be true,
But then she took a needle from her purse, and pricked the royal
derrière,
The spell de ated, a few people in the crowd began to cheer,
And even the tenured courtiers began to fear
The common-sense critique we call a Barb.
I thought I might work up a rap version of this poem for music television.
In it, I think Barbara should wear the fabulous orange and gray Ghanaian
out t with the matching turban that she wore brie y at last summer’s International Association for Feminist Economics conference. While writing this
paper, I sent Barbara an e-mail message and asked for a copy of her vita and
she sent it with the following quali cation:
It says nothing about my upbringing in the sour-cream-drenched
Bronx, God’s mistake in failing to answer my prayer when I was 5, my
crucial visit to the Russian pavilion at the New York World’s Fair in
1938, my maiden air trip in the same year from LaGuardia Airport to
Newark Airport and back, my years roaming the Cornell campus in
high heels and lipstick in the fruitless quest for a husband, and the
time I was accused by an of cial of the Census Bureau of sabotaging
the 1980 Census.
I realized my own vita says nothing about the really important events in my
life either. Like when Barbara Bergmann, whom I had never met, called me

up on the phone one day and told me she liked an article I had written for
Feminist Studies, and invited me to participate in an American Economics
Association session she had organized. Or when she taught me how to
maneuver through the International Economics Association while we drank
ouzo in Athens. Or when she found a place for me at American University
one semester at a point when my own university was driving me out of my
mind. And then there was the time at the IAFFE conference in Tours when
she accused me of being Victor Fuchs in drag.
As I remember, I was insisting that there are some important differences
in the supply of men’s and women’s labor. Unlike Professor Fuchs, who
seems to believe such differences are biologically-given preferences, I think
these differences are culturally constructed and socially contested. (I’ll say
more about this later.) Barbara remains suspicious. I considered asking Professor Fuchs if he would be willing to appear in drag at the 1997 AEA session
honoring her, to show that I can in fact be distinguished from him. It is
rumored that Professor Deirdre McCloskey warned him that such actions
at an academic conference could lead to incarceration. In any case, Professor Fuchs did not materialize.
T H E B E S T O F B A RB A R A
At the risk of retracing ground already covered by other authors, I would
like to summarize Barbara’s contributions to both the substance and style
of economic theory. At the risk of belaboring the obvious I emphasize that
she has been a pioneer in the development of a feminist analysis of both
the labor market and the family. Building on a tradition of liberal feminism that goes back to John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, she has explained
how legal rules and cultural norms can affect market outcomes in ways distinctly disadvantageous to women. She has effectively extended the principles of equal opportunity to a critique of the sexual division of labor.
Her 1974 article, “Occupational Segregation, Wages and Pro ts When
Employers Discriminate by Race and Sex,” offered a clear and concise
model of the effects of crowding women and minorities into a restricted
number of occupations (Barbara Bergmann 1974). It clearly identi ed the
ways in which male workers, as well as employers, bene ted from discrimination. It became an early rallying point for criticisms of the neoclassical
argument that competitive market forces would drive discriminators out of
business.
Many labor economists in the 1970s and 1980s adopted the basic human
capital model that treated earnings as a function of education and experience, but interpreted the unexplained residual in their equations as a
measure of discrimination. While Barbara has often drawn from these
results to make her own points, she has long argued (correctly, I think) that
this is not a particularly fruitful line of inquiry because it fails to directly

confront the process of discrimination itself. In her efforts to develop a
broader, more institutional analysis, she realized that the economics profession is more interested in fancy clothes than in naked truths, and
decided to reach out to a wider, younger audience. Her Economic Emergence
of Women, published in 1981, has been widely used in undergraduate social
science classes, and helps account for the emergence of a new cohort of
scholars who understand that “feminist economics” is not a contradiction
in terms (Bergmann 1981).
This book developed a comprehensive analysis of a “sex-role caste system”
quite similar to what socialist feminist theorists like Heidi Hartmann were
calling “patriarchy” (Heidi Hartmann 1976). While Barbara was optimistic
that the forces of economic development, modernization, and increased
female labor force participation were undermining this caste system, she
also emphasized the need for strong feminist public policies. Rather than
focusing on econometric results, she summarized the direct evidence of discrimination emerging from new opportunities for legal redress such as
equal pay legislation.
My favorite example is Irene LoRe. When Irene applied to the Chase
Manhattan Bank for a job as an executive trainee and didn’t get an answer
promptly, she assumed her application had been lost. She sent in a second
one, and eventually two answers came from the bank. One, addressed to
“Mr. LoRe,” asked the applicant to come in for an interview. The other,
addressed to “Ms. LoRe,” advised her that there were no job openings
(Bergmann 1986: 62). Barbara’s advice to the profession has long been that
we need to be more willing to collect our data and conduct our own experiments, rather than relying on stylized econometric analysis of existing data
sets. Researchers have  nally begun to follow this advice, seeking systematic
evidence of discrimination by using a “tester” methodology, in which two
applicants for the same job are identical except for their race or gender
(Michael Fix and Raymond J. Struyk 1993).
It is still easy, of course, to  nd many examples of economics journal
articles that are entirely preoccupied with the development of self-referential mathematical and empirical analysis. However, the new institutionalist
economics which Barbara helped energize has had a discernible impact
even among many economists working primarily within a neoclassical paradigm. Two examples come to mind. In Understanding the Gender Gap, published in 1990, Claudia Goldin amends her otherwise conventional human
capital approach with a Bergmannesque discussion of the impact of the
marriage bars, rules widely enforced against the employment of married
women between the 1920s and the 1940s (Claudia Goldin 1990). Similarly,
in Race and Schooling in the South, 1880–1950, Robert Margo enriches his
analysis with a detailed analysis of the impact of the racial caste system in
that region on school quality for African-Americans (Robert Margo 1990).
Barbara’s theory of a sex-role caste system has implications for

understanding the family, as well as the labor market. In her “The Economic Risks of Being a Housewife,” published in the American Economic Review
in 1981, Barbara explicitly questioned both the ef ciency and the equity of
the traditional housewife role (Bergmann 1981). She pointed out that any
person who specializes in nonmarket work not only becomes vulnerable to
the abuse of a more powerful partner, but also faces a high economic risk
in the event of marital dissolution. Many of these points were elaborated
further in The Economic Emergence of Women, and along with the work of Marianne Ferber they helped set the stage for later research on inequality
within the family. Some of Barbara’s policy prescriptions in this arena, such
as improved child support enforcement, have gradually gained widespread
acceptance.
Still, the 1990s are, so far, a decade of even stronger political backlash
than the 1980s. Support for active anti-discrimination efforts has faded, and
the very concept of public responsibility for families living in poverty has
been undermined. Barbara’s response has been to intensify her efforts to
reach a broader audience, with two new books published in 1996 and 1997,
In Defense of Afrmative Action and Saving Our Children from Poverty: What the
U.S. Can Learn from France (Bergmann 1996, 1997). The  rst of these has
already been reviewed in major newspapers such as the Washington Post and
the New York Times, and is widely considered the best retort to the conservative assault on af rmative action. It argues forcefully that the alternative to af rmative action is not neutrality or objectivity, but rather
continued discrimination against women and people of color.
Two particularly vivid images illustrate Barbara’s highly accessible style of
reasoning and writing. The parable of the bus stop evokes the memory of
Rosa Parks without explicitly referring to her refusal to sit on the back of
the bus, the episode that helped spark the Civil Rights Movement. Imagine,
Barbara says, a white man who has been waiting in line on a street corner
in the rain. The buses don’t come as often as they used to, and he is getting
impatient. A black man comes to the corner, accompanied by a police
of cer, who explains he is going to make sure the black man gets on the
next bus. The white man says, “That’s unfair. He should wait in line like the
rest of us.” The black man explains that he has been waiting in line, but the
drivers have refused to let him on. The white man objects that is not his
fault. The bus rolls up. We can see through the windows that the only
people on board are whites. Ah, says the black man, what do you think
would happen if the policeman were to go away right now?
This is a parable that concedes a point that many critics of af rmative
action have made: the principle of racial (and gender) justice imposes some
costs on whites (and men), whether or not they have themselves been
responsible for discrimination. But Barbara goes on to explain that all questions of justice create similar dilemmas. It is never easy to de ne the greater
good. As she puts it:

The opponents of af rmative action imply by their arguments that
causing harm to innocent individuals so as to achieve some other
bene t is totally impermissible and never done, but that is not true.
In our economic life, we frequently do harm to innocent individuals
for the purpose of achieving some goal. Keeping the unemployment
rate high to  ght off in ation is one example. That does substantial
harm to millions of people. Another is  ring workers so that a
company can reduce its costs.
(Bergmann 1996: 102)
These examples have a subtext: Our culture seems perfectly willing to sacri ce individual rights on the altar of economic growth.
A second powerful image, a family at meal time, conjures up what are
usually considered traditional family values. But while admiring the beautiful apple pie on the table, consider how it should be divided up. In some
countries, Barbara points out, women would get a share only if the men
decided to give them some. In the United States, however, we normally
assume that every family member who wants a piece of the pie will get one,
and we use that principle to divide things up. We consider most forms of
inherited privilege unacceptable, so why should we tolerate employment
discrimination? As Barbara points out, “setting af rmative action goals and
sharing the family pie have this in common: they are both done in the
understanding that historical privileges are unfair, and should not persist”
(Bergmann 1996: 84).
The style of argument evokes one of Tom Paine’s broadsides on behalf
of the American Revolution in 1776 (Thomas Paine 1997). Barbara is the
embodiment of uncommon common sense. In Saving Our Children From
Poverty, she doesn’t wax poetic; she pokes at our national pride. The French
can keep their children out of poverty, so why can’t we? Critics of this book
will say that it is out of touch with the current mood of the American people,
who want to spend less on the poor, not more. But a majority of Americans,
if polled by the New York Times in the miserable winter of 1775, would probably have expressed loyalty to King George. Barbara’s detailed analysis of
the French child care and family allowance system, which encourages a high
rate of labor force participation among women, frames a positive vision of
family policy that could help the United States rebuild its currently shipwrecked system of public assistance.
BA R B AR I S M S A N D C I V I L I Z A T I O N
While I have many colleagues who love to bask in praise, I know that
Barbara would feel bored and restless if she did not read something she
could disagree with. It seems appropriate to honor her tradition of critical

inquiry by picking a  ght. Actually, it’s not criticism I want to offer but a list
of a few important things that Barbara has left for the rest of us to do.
First, I think we (and by that I mean we feminist theorists and we economists) need to think more about the similarities between inequalities based
on gender and race, and those based on other aspects of group identity,
such as age, sexual orientation, class, and nation. We can not denounce one
or two forms of inherited inequality and ignore others. Some readers of In
Defense of Afrmative Action might be tempted to conclude that if we could
just eliminate sexism and racism, we could be quite happy with the way our
economic systems are putt-putting along. There are, of course, strategic
limits; it is impossible to change everything at once. Still, we need a larger
set of moral and political ideals to which we can hold ourselves and others
accountable. That the traditional socialist vision of these ideals now seems
profoundly  awed does not mean that the traditional liberal, individualist
vision has suddenly become adequate.
The Marxian theory of history doesn’t provide much of a guide to the
future. But, as Gertrude Stein was fond of pointing out, history teaches us
that history teaches. We can, and eventually will, develop a uni ed theory
of how and why some groups gang up on other groups or, as Luke Skywalker
called it, the “dark side of the force.” Right now, the best key we have to this
uni ed theory is the remarkable story of the emergence, consolidation, and
eventual weakening of patriarchal structures of constraint. We need to generalize and apply what we have learned to the analysis of other structures
of constraint that may be more dif cult for us to see because they are even
more hegemonic. In the short run these theoretical efforts may seem an
indulgence, but contrary to Keynes, we will not all be dead in the long run.
Some of our students and children will be around to apply what we have
learned.
We need to be more explicit about developing a theory of what we might
call “good norms” and “good preferences.” Along with other feminist theorists, Barbara has articulated a strong critique of a subset of norms and
preferences associated with gender roles: the notion that men should be
tough, aggressive, and self-interested, but women should be tender, passive,
and altruistic. Conservatives have tried to reify such de nitions of masculinity and femininity by deriving them from God or Nature. We argue that
these de nitions are, in large part, the culturally constructed by-products
of a patriarchal society. Once we reject them, however, we are left with the
task of reconstructing a less gendered vision of human nature.
Who do we take as our model – Adam or Eve? Here comes the venerable
dilemma known as equality versus difference, pasted on a bumper-sticker
one still occasionally sees in college towns, “Women Who Want to Be Like
Men Lack Ambition.” The real question is what both women and men
should want to be. In a competitive labor market, the traits we have
traditionally called masculine pay off. As Paula England and others have

empirically demonstrated, the exercise of authority in a job is strongly
associated with high pay. The exercise of nurturance, on the other hand, is
strongly associated with low pay (Paula England et al. 1994). In a hawk–dove
game, the hawks win (until they have rendered the doves extinct). Should
we encourage young women to be hawk-like? I think Barbara leans in this
direction, because she associates dove-like qualities with, to mix a
metaphor, the underdog. In the context of this game – kill or be killed – I
think she is right. But perhaps we should change the game, introduce a
swan, big enough and strong enough to protect herself but with no compelling need to prey on smaller birds.
Ever since Adam Smith, economists have relied on the assumption that
our moral sentiments are so inborn that we can encourage one another
to be self-interested without lapsing into selfishness. But feminist theory
suggests that this assumption is overoptimistic. Women’s altruism, especially towards children and other dependents, has long provided a counterbalance to the individualism of the marketplace. If women are to become
more self-interested it seems to me that men must become more altruistic. Neoclassical economists are always talking about “getting the prices
right.” Institutionalist economists need to explain how much more important it is to “get the norms right.” Without better rules and norms of
cooperation, we could regress to the Hobbesian world of the war of all
against all.
My third and  nal point. I don’t think we can rely on the expansion of
markets to provide the services once guaranteed by wives, mothers, and
daughters. Barbara heralds the industrialization of housework, the transfer
of activities from the private to the public realm. I agree with her that this
has been, so far, a largely positive force. Women in many countries are no
longer destined by biology to assume the most tedious and least remunerative tasks. On the other hand, the substitutes that have been hired – the
maids, nannies, child care workers, and practical nurses – are almost all
women who come from less privileged countries and classes than their
clients. We can buy cheap substitutes for our own time only if other people’s
labor is cheap. I have argued elsewhere that extreme wage inequality undermines gender solidarity and feminist awareness by dividing women along
class lines (Nancy Folbre 1994). I love Peggy Nelson’s examples of the ways
some career women relate to child care providers in much the same way
that some husbands relate to housewives: “Aren’t you lucky, dear, to be able
to stay home with the kids”; “ You don’t mind giving me a little extra time,
do you, your job is so much less stressful than mine” (Margaret Nelson
1990).
Furthermore, when we analyze the transfer of services from the family to
the market, we need to consider the ways in which social context shapes the
quality of work. I don’t believe that family members motivated by a sense
of social obligation necessarily provide services inherently superior to those

paid for by the hour. However, I do think that increased reliance on forms
of labor motivated entirely by pecuniary concerns poses some genuine risks
to dependents, like children, the sick, and the elderly, who cannot monitor
or control workers who provide them with services. Susan Eaton’s research
on the low quality of care in many nursing homes should give us genuine
cause for concern (Susan Eaton 1996).
Members of a family, a neighborhood, a community have some responsibilities towards one another that cannot be met by purchased substitutes. I
would rather see working age adults make a joint decision to reduce their
hours of paid work – up to a point – than rely too heavily on purchased
care. As a result, I am slightly less enthusiastic than Barbara about the
French child care system. To the extent that we do rely on markets for care
services, we should try to guarantee that they foster long-run respect and
reciprocity, rather than faceless, impersonal exchanges. They should be
markets mediated by strong, androgynous norms of care and affection for
others.
I am probably asking for too much. I think Barbara taught me how to do
that, along with Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Emma Goldman, Susan B.
Anthony, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and a long list of other heroines and heroes. Barbara has always reminded me a bit of Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, with un inching gaze and generous bosom. I have always identi ed a bit with Emma Goldman, the anarcho-socialist who wore wire-rim
glasses and wanted everyone to dance. But I think we all toast Susan B.
Anthony and her life-long motto: “Defeat is impossible.” Down with the
emperor!
Nancy Folbre, University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics,
Thompson Hall, Amherst, MA 01033, USA
e-mail: folbre@econs.umass.edu
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